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WELCOME
DEAN TREANOR: Good evening, everyone. My name is Bill
Treanor. I am the Dean of Fordham Law School. It’s my pleasure to
welcome you to our program tonight, Corporate Accountability:
Governance and Compensation Issues.
I’ll be turning matters over to Professor Gus Katsoris in a minute,
but I want to make a few welcoming remarks.
I have to say this is an amazing panel. Our Corporate Law Center
does great event after great event, but even within the history of our
Corporate Law Center, this is really a standout event.
At Fordham Law, we take business law very seriously. It’s really at
the core of what we do, and we have an amazing business law faculty,
and we’re joined by some of them tonight. I’d like to recognize
Professor Martin Gelter, Professor Richard Squire, and Professor Gus
Katsoris, who are all mainstays of our great program.
We have a phenomenal Corporate Law Center, which was created
in 2001 and since that time has done an amazing job of strengthening the
business law program at Fordham. The Chair of the Corporate Law
Center Board of Advisors is Paul Soden, who joins us, as well as two
Board Members, Pamela Chepiga and Bob Hollweg.
The Director of the Corporate Law Center, Ann Rakoff, really
worked long and hard and did so much to put together this fabulous
program. She was assisted by Zach Slates, who is our Corporate Law
Center Fellow, and by Jeanne Rosendale, who really did so much to help
bring this evening together.
I’d like to express the Law School’s great gratitude to the Becker
Ross firm for their generosity in establishing the DeStefano Lecture
Series. We’re delighted to have Howard Justvig and his wife Flora with
us tonight.
We also have, from the Pace School of Business, Professor John
James, who has brought a dozen students from his MBA class in
comparative corporate governance.
I just want to make you aware that we have other great programs
coming up. This Friday, March12, we’ll be having an all-day academic
conference on New Ideas for Limiting Bank Size. And then, on March
31, there will be a lecture by Ken Feinberg, TARP Special Master for
Executive Compensation.
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And, as we do all of these things, we work very closely with our
great Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which has been
cited by the Supreme Court. It’s one of the top five corporate law
journals in the country. It has fabulous leadership. Thank you very
much.
Without any further ado, let me turn matters over to our legendary
business law faculty member, Constantine “Gus” Katsoris.

OPENING REMARKS
PROF. KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I’d like to welcome you here
tonight. Unfortunately, they could not be with us, but they send their
regrets and their best wishes.
For those of you who have never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly
describe him to you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review,
and graduated at the top of his class. He then went on to become a
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly
mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted himself to
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our
students.
In short, Al DeStefano was a symbol of what Fordham Law School
was in the past, he is a symbol of what Fordham Law School still is, and
he will remain a symbol of what Fordham Law School will be in the
future.
Since its inception less than a decade ago, the DeStefano Lectures
have covered a wide range of timely and diverse topics, such as: the
need for market regulation, the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur
Andersen, strengthening the protection for investors, making our capital
markets more transparent and, last year, the subprime mortgage
meltdown. Sadly, the effects of that meltdown still linger, resulting in
what many call the Great Recession.
Interestingly, everybody is busy blaming everybody else for the
meltdown. The truth is many must share the blame, starting with the
mortgage brokers; the loan reviewers who applied few, if any, standards;
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there were also the lenders and investment bankers, who
indiscriminately packaged subprime mortgages into securities and sold
them throughout the world; there were the insurance, securities, and
bank regulators, who seemed oblivious to the risks; and finally, the
rating agencies that overrated the safety of these products. Ironically,
many of the politicians who now seek reforms or reelection must also
bear some of the responsibility for either creating or fostering some of
the programs that inflated the bubble, or by simply ignoring many of the
warning signals along the way.
In short, to borrow a phrase from the past describing a different
economic crisis, “where were the professionals when these improper
transactions were being consummated?” These words appeared in an
opinion issued by Judge Sporkin in upholding the federal seizure of the
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association some thirty years ago. They were
appropriate then and they are still relevant today.
Shareholders are also to be faulted for not taking a more active
interest in the companies they owned, instead of relying upon the selfserving rhetoric of their CEOs that “shareholder value” was being
created, only to be subsequently shocked when the enormous retirement
packages were paid to executives as they were exiting and leaving their
companies in shambles.
There is no question that a major contributing factor to the Great
Recession was greed — greed that sought short-term gain regardless of
the long-term consequences, greed that often assumed risk could be
passed on to counterparties, ignoring the fact that the risk did not go
away and remained in the financial system.
Sadly, this game of Russian roulette was engaged in not only by
speculators, but also by regulated banks and insurance companies.
Feeding this greed that led to our present dilemma was the method
by which we compensated corporate executives, by encouraging them to
engage in this enormous risk-taking — not with their own money, but
with that of the shareholders and others. This is one of the topics our
panel will discuss tonight, excessive executive compensation.
About six months ago, we were privileged to host a special lecture
in this very room by William Dudley, President of the New York
Federal Reserve, who eloquently discussed the financial meltdown as of
last year. It was a few days after Ken Lewis had announced his
retirement as Chairman of Bank of America and a search committee had
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been formed. Ken Feinberg had already become the “salary czar.”
At the end of the lecture, in the question-and-answer period, I
pointed out that although some governmental oversight was clearly
understandable, it should not be “penny wise and pound foolish” so as to
be counterproductive in the search to get a competent CEO for a very
difficult job. I then asked the question, that if he, Mr. Dudley, and I
were on the Bank of America search committee, where would we look
for a successor, what type of person would we look for, what type of
compensation would be necessary to induce the proper person to take
the job, and to what extent should the government influence the process?
That was six months ago. A lot has happened since then in the
board rooms of companies like AIG, GMAC, General Motors, Bank of
America, and even with companies like Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley, as they reformulated their compensation packages in seeking to
avoid public wrath and indignation regarding executive compensation.
Tonight, we are privileged to have with us an extraordinary panel of
experts. On behalf of corporate America, as it looks to the future and as
it looks for guidance, I ask the same question of the panel tonight: if you
and I were on such a search committee, where would you look, who
would you look for, how much would you pay, and what form would
that compensation take, and, in the process, what input should you
expect from the government?
I would now like to say a few words about tonight’s moderator, our
chairman of the panel, Judge Sporkin, and then he will introduce the rest
of the panel.
After graduating from Yale Law School in 1957 — which,
incidentally, was the year I graduated from Fordham Law School — he
worked in private practice for a few years, and in 1961 he became a staff
attorney at the SEC. In 1974, he became Chief of the Enforcement
Division, where he served for eight years in that capacity. Thereafter, he
served as General Counsel to the CIA for five years, until he was
appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by
President Reagan, where he presided over many notable and high-profile
cases. Upon retirement from the bench, he returned to private practice.
Throughout his career, he has always championed the public
interest and relentlessly sought the pursuit of justice. In short, Stanley
Sporkin is no shrinking violet. Indeed, he is a no-nonsense, two-fisted
public servant.
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On the other hand, I can also personally attest to his softer side. As
you know, in academia we have a saying: “publish or perish.” Thus, out
of necessity, in order to survive in academia, from time to time I was
forced to publish various articles, which I distributed to a select captive
audience. They are captive because once you are on the list you never
get off until one of us dies. Judge Sporkin is on that list.
More often than not, like a bill collector who sends out overdue
statements, I rarely hear from this select group once they receive one of
my articles. But not Judge Sporkin. He would take the time out to
courteously acknowledge receipt and graciously encourage me to write
again. Most importantly, he has never asked to be taken off that list.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I introduce to
you The Honorable Stanley Sporkin.

PANEL DISCUSSION
JUDGE SPORKIN: That was terrific. Great introduction.
I didn’t know I was going to be offered a job as the head of the
Bank of America today. I seem to fit that bill. I don’t know if my wife
would like living in North Carolina.
I see a number of old friends in the audience here today. Of course,
Jeanne Rosendale, Ann Rakoff, and Judge Rakoff are here today, and we
are very grateful to have them. I see Simon Lorne, Jim Buck, Ed
Fleischman, and many good old friends here.
We’re going to discuss a number of subjects. But the first thing I
want to do is give short introductions and offer no jobs to the panel. I
don’t have any to offer.
Todd Lang is an old associate of mine, really one of the great
people in the legal profession. While I could go through and say he
graduated from Yale Law School and all that other stuff, what I really
admire about him is he, along with Ira Millstein and Harvey Miller, in
effect started their own firm in the late 1950s or early 1960s. Would
you believe, that firm started by these three people is now in competition
with the best in the world — not the best in America, the best in the
world? Anybody that can do that is really an outstanding lawyer.
Gary Naftalis beat you, Todd, because his law firm, Kramer Levin,
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has his name in the firm. You need to get your name in the firm. Gary
and I go back again — what do you figure, sixty years? — and we’ve
been friends ever since. He is not only a great lawyer, but he is a decent
human being. Our friendship has shown that. He, of course, graduated
from Columbia Law School and Brown University.
The other two people are just as distinguished.
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld has a tremendous record at Yale. Business
Week called Mr. Sonnenfeld one of the world’s ten most influential
business school professors, and Directorship magazine listed him among
the hundred most influential figures in corporate governance. He is now
the Lester Crown Professor of Management Practice at the Yale School
of Management — for which I take my hat off to him, because when I
was at Yale they didn’t want to get involved in any of this financial
stuff; they thought it was too much like plumbing.
Then we have Louise Story, who writes for The New York Times.
She graduated from Yale and Columbia University. Again, she is going
to be one of the great writers. In addition to being a publicist for Judge
Rakoff, she has done some very great work on her own. And he needs
no publicist, believe me.
Let me just quickly start out.
We keep looking at what has happened in this great meltdown. We
look at it in the terms that we know — the financial upheaval, the fact
that we went from a problem in connection with a real estate problem
and turned it into a financial problem.
Well, the problem there was we’ve had real estate problems in the
past. They never became a financial problem. They became a financial
problem when we took the wall down. We securitized the real estate,
and of course when the real estate collapsed, so began the financial
collapse.
But let me take you a step back. It’s my contention — and it’s
something that I spoke on years ago, before the current administration
said, “Hey, we think the problem is jobs.” Of course it’s jobs. We
screwed this country up so badly over the years that when I now look
back, I cannot believe it.
Did we see what was going to happen when we let all our jobs from
this nation go overseas? And now we’re saying, “people can’t pay for
the real estate.” Of course they can’t.
I just read in the newspaper a little while back — a person was
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describing a town in Massachusetts called Palmer. This is what the
article said:
In this once prosperous, now depressed, former mill town in western
Massachusetts, residents casually rattle off the names of all the
factories that shut down long ago and of the businesses getting ready
to leave. ‘Everything is closing down,’ said Robin Moriarty, who
has worked here in her father’s corner grocery store since she was in
high school. The video place wants to close; Comcast closed; there
was a fruit company across the street, they left; the taxi company
wants to close; there was a flower shop across the street, she’s gone.
That’s what’s happened. It’s a ghost town. We allowed these jobs
to go. Where did they go? They went to countries based upon the
fact that they’re not paying competitive wages, slave labor.

And everybody’s to blame. I even place some of the blame on the
unions. Somebody, when I was talking about this to a union person,
said, “How dare you?”
I said, “What you did is you gave cover to the business people to
leave this country.”
That’s what happened. Unless we deal with that problem, we’re
never going to get out of this mess. And it’s a very, very difficult
problem to start bringing back these jobs.
Now, the governor of Massachusetts had a solution for the problem
in Palmer.
Does anybody know who is going to bring back industry to Palmer?
Does anybody know what the industry was going to be? Can you guess
how they’re going to resurrect this little mill town?
Gambling. So those are the jobs we’re going to create. You can
see what that’s all about.
But really, to start blaming jobs and the financial markets we would
be dealing with judgments and not the root cause. The financial markets
certainly do not get any glory out of what happened. Surely they could
have done a much better job, but you’ve still got to get to the root cause
in order to solve the problem. I hope we can get better economists now
who can help us and stop talking in slogans — “free trade,” “free this”
and “free that.” It isn’t going to work.
We’ve really got to drill down and go right back to the basics and
start creating and bringing in jobs, creating real companies. We don’t
even have — if we were in a national security crisis matter — the
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wherewithal to create implements of war. Where are we going to go?
Indeed, recently we had to go to a French company to build some of the
airplanes needed by the Air Force.
Sure, I was in favor of bailing out General Motors, because we need
General Motors if we have a national security threat and have to build
heavy duty tanks and artillery. We can’t strip this country of things of
that kind.
At this time I’m going to ask Todd to get back into the real world of
finance and talk a little bit about the proxy issues.
Go ahead, Todd.
MR. LANG: Okay.
For me, talking about proxy access is the “seven-year itch.” The
reason is that about seven years ago the SEC initially put out a concept
release on the subject, and it then proposed a rule. I won’t burden you
with all the intervening details, but this has been live action up to this
past June, when the SEC made a proxy access proposal.
It consists of 250 pages and propounds over 500 questions. The
subject matter is complex and it is very controversial.
The proxy access regime will apply to more than 10,000 publicly
held corporations, each with its own capital and voting structure, and
other relevant arrangements that may be affected by the creation of an
access right.
A clear definition of the purpose of the creation of that right is key
to establish the parameters of access and avoid its use for other
purposes.
The SEC in its Proposing Release asserts there are two purposes to
the access rulemaking initiative which it had undertaken. The first is “to
remove an impediment to the ability of shareholders to nominate and
elect directors.” The second is “to enable long-term holders of a
meaningful number of shares of a corporation to use the corporation’s
proxy materials to nominate a limited number of candidates for election
as directors, but with no control, intent, or effect.” That is very
important.
Thus, the category of eligible shareholder is for the most part
institutions and others who exercise their governance rights but who do
not have a control or other comparable agenda or planned activity.
If the access rulemaking occurs, there will be no impediment. So
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the purpose would primarily be to that other category of shareholder
which I mentioned.
Final rulemaking will provide criteria for the eligibility of a
proponent shareholder or group of shareholders, as well as the maximum
number of access directors who may be elected annually and in the
aggregate. Candidates will likely be independent of the corporation
under the objective director independence rules of the stock exchanges
with, at least as proposed, no independence requirement in relation to
the sponsor. That is a highly contentious issue.
There will be numerous other provisions, including the means of
establishing priority in the situation where there is more than one
eligible shareholder who seeks to exercise the right in a specific election.
There also will be modification or elimination of the director
election exclusion under Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule.
The SEC’s proposal establishes an access right by means of what is
called a prescriptive rule. Thus, primary terms of access are established
by the SEC and can only be modified by a rule change or interpreted
through an advisory opinion under the SEC’s no-action process.
It seems as if such a prescriptive rule would preempt governance
structures and arrangements of individual corporations. This raises a
federal-state issue in terms of jurisdiction in such matters of corporate
governance.
One practical effect of a prescriptive rule is that it could limit the
ability of the corporation and its shareholders to adapt the access right to
the existing corporate structure and arrangements, and deal with future
opportunities and needs.
In passing, note there is a longstanding question as to the authority
of the SEC to adopt such a rule, but legislation is pending in Congress
which seeks to provide that authority.
Access does not exist under state law, except in North Dakota.
Under state law generally, bylaws would be the customary means of
providing a right of access, taking into account the individual corporate
structure and governance arrangements. There is, therefore, a tension
between enabling corporations to adopt such bylaws and the desirability
and right of the federal agency to prescribe such rules.
In addition, a matter of considerable concern is the workability of
the prescriptive rule. It seems clear that private ordering would be a
preferable vehicle to establish an access right for the defined purpose
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and, among other advantages, to avoid workability concerns.
Final rulemaking may take some or all of this into account and
make some provision for private ordering. It also may enable
shareholders — not directors — to vote to opt out of an access regime
or, in the alternative, to opt into one. Another possibility is the SEC will
adopt a default rule establishing a prescriptive right of access after a
transition period for those corporations who have not adopted and
maintained an appropriate access bylaw.
It is anticipated that final rulemaking will be achieved soon. But
there is no firm deadline. We’ve heard this before and the date for final
rulemaking continues to be extended.
It is also anticipated that there is going to be an extensive transition
period after adoption, to enable corporations and their shareholders to
adjust to the new rule and to comply with newly created disclosure and
filing requirements.
I was asked to define access in a nutshell, meaning five minutes. I
probably have adhered to that, sort of. But I’ve only given you the
highlights. There is a great deal more.
In this case, the devil may well be in the details. Let’s all stay
tuned, because this initiative is likely to enter a new active phase in the
very near future.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Todd, let me ask you this question. Can
corporate democracy really work? Can there be a democratic way for
the shareholders to vote and elect management that would carry out their
wishes?
MR. LANG: Let me answer it this way. The whole voting system
is under reconsideration, because there are a lot of problems with it. It
hasn’t kept up with technology; votes are not accurately counted all the
time; shareholders are not the record owners of shares and often don’t
vote themselves since intermediaries vote their interests in the complex
voting process; and proxy advisors have significant influence on how
shares are voted. And so the answer is that “democracy” is a political
term, not descriptive of the actual corporate voting system.
I think you can have a greater participation by shareholders in the
process through a variety of means, and many people are working on
that project. The SEC has an education group working on trying to
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communicate with shareholders in plain English so they will be better
able to exercise their voting rights.
When you talk about shareholders, who are they? I mean
shareholders’ stock is often voted by others — it used to be brokers, not
as much anymore. Their financial interest is often voted by pension
trusts, unions, and other intermediaries and investment vehicles. Hedge
funds know how to vote their own shares and they have their own
money to back it up. In reality, the individual retail shareholder does a
limited amount of voting of his or her shares directly. To compound the
problem, proxy materials are complex and often difficult to understand,
which in turn poses a difficulty for shareholders in terms of making
informed voting decisions.
So I think the objective is to protect the voting franchise, and
educate shareholders with respect to voting matters. This should
enhance the democratic features of the voting system.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Louise, we’re going to have this wonderful
proxy system. What about the pay involved in these? In other words,
when I become the CEO of Bank of America, how shall I determine how
much I should be paid?
MS. STORY: Pay has been one of the major controversies of this
crisis. It is one of the issues that everyone can understand. We and the
rest of the media have written about it a lot.
What I find interesting is that now we are not that far away on pay
than we were a year ago. If you remember, in January 2009, President
Obama called the Wall Street bonuses “shameful.” He was talking then
about the 2008 bonuses, but it was January 2009, and he called the 2008
bonuses “shameful.” We’re back now with pay going up.
So one of the things that a lot of people in the government have said
is that shareholders, through voting and the proxy and things like “say
on pay,” might help rein pay in. But I think that is going to have limited
effect because shareholders would only vote on the very top executive
pay. The vote is often not binding, and the companies don’t have to
follow it. And then, the really unique thing about Wall Street pay is that
people 100 deep in the company, or even 1,000 deep in the company, are
often making millions of dollars and taking on big risks for the
companies. So on Wall Street it may bear fruit for the government to
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think more about pay at a far deeper level than shareholders typically
vote on.
So I am a little skeptical that the proxy initiatives “say on pay” are
going to change Wall Street pay in a big way.
JUDGE SPORKIN: What do you think? If you were going to
design a system involving your government, how far can the
government go in telling these people how much they should be paid
under our system?
MS. STORY: Well, the problem is that they appointed this
Compensation Special Master, Ken Feinberg, who will be speaking here
soon, so you all can put questions to him. But the problem is he was
only appointed to oversee pay at companies that still had an exceptional
amount of bailout money. And so by the time he got going, Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, so many of the companies, had returned their
money and he was only really overseeing Bank of America and
Citigroup as for the big banks. He will not oversee Bank of America
and Citigroup this year. They have already returned most of their
money, in the case of Citigroup, and Bank of America has returned it all.
So I think that one thing the government should rethink is, even
though these companies are no longer beholden to the government for
bailout money, given that there is this implicit “too big to fail” belief
now, does that mean that there should be someone other than
shareholders that have a say? Because you know that if companies take
big risks and we’re going to bail them out again, there may be some
lasting role that the government should play in pay, which is a break
from the past if they were to do it.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Is there anybody that thinks that under our
form of government that we could really tell a private company how
much they can pay their executives? Todd or anybody join in. Is there a
theory, other than if they are taking federal money? But if there is no
reliance on federal money? Can we — I guess we could do it through
the taxing system, can’t we?
MR. LANG: I don’t think so. I mean we had a war. We had price
controls and wage controls. We had a Wage Stabilization Board, and
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they set all the rules and so forth. But you have to have that kind of
crisis to justify that.
JUDGE SPORKIN: But isn’t there a rule that talks about if
somebody gets over $1 million in pay?
MR. LANG: It is Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code.
JUDGE SPORKIN: What does that say? You’ve got to familiarize
us.
MR. LANG: The corporation cannot deduct more than $1 million in
compensation for defined executives unless it has earned it in a
particular way, and satisfying that test has gotten tougher.
JUDGE SPORKIN: So you can’t deduct it?
MR. LANG: The deduction is limited as I indicated.
JUDGE SPORKIN: So in other words, under the taxing power,
what you are saying is there is a limited way of the federal government
to involve itself in pay, right? They could do it that way. They could
assess a surtax. They could do a lot of things, couldn’t they?
MR. LANG: Stanley, it hasn’t worked.
JUDGE SPORKIN: I’m not saying whether it’s going to work. I’m
trying to find out whether they have the ability to do it. You’re probably
right. Believe me, I’m not here suggesting it.
MR. LANG: Just let me say this. The tax law has been used a few
times, including golden parachutes, but people have negotiated around
it, and there are exceptions because Congress had a limit as to what it
wanted to do.
So the question now is: under present circumstances, with the
public mood being what it is, are there other things that can be done
other than saying, “we’re going to have good practices, more disclosure,
and we are going to try to limit compensation on a sensible basis rather
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than legislate it”? That’s the issue.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Louise, would you have any other suggestions?
MS. STORY: Yes. I think that in this “too big to fail” legislation
that is in Congress, it is possible the government could create a new
rationale for a government rule on pay, because it is not enough to say
that they can regulate pay once a company takes bailouts. Companies
now have an implicit guarantee that the government will bail them out.
So I think it is possible that they could develop a new rationale based on
that.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Very interesting.
All right. Let’s talk to the Dean. Dean Sonnenfeld, what do you
have to say about the latest in corporate governance?
PROFESSOR SONNENFELD: Well, that’s a big question. It’s
almost as big as Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage you
opened with. There’s a lot to master in one panel.
I think that this is something which really stands out in corporate
governance that might be a little bit contrarian with the direction of the
panel so far. I don’t know where Gary is going to come out, but I kind
of feel like the mosquito in a nudist colony. I hardly know where to
strike first here, Judge.
I think there are real limits to the law in this whole debate. Whether
or not it is compensation or the larger governance arenas, the law is a
tool, a largely inadequate and clumsy tool, to get to something that is our
objective. We are looking at personal accountability of our leaders.
Corporate accountability is a byproduct of that. We want smart,
informed, hardworking, long-term-oriented folks that are responsive to
their shareholders and their communities, and with some personal
integrity.
Louise, I’d differ with you a little bit about what the results of Ken
Feinberg’s interventions are, because it speaks again to the limits of the
law. You’re right; legally he is constrained to just over 100 executives.
And yet, I think he has had an enormous effect in bringing in a kind of
personal accountability to this, because there is a cultural issue.
If you take a look at what Jeff Immelt said in a speech recently, or
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what he did as CEO of GE, to forgo his bonus, that’s a big deal. He just
said:
We are at the end of a difficult generation of business leadership, and
maybe leadership in general. Tough-mindedness, a good trait, was
replaced by meanness and greed - terrible traits. As a result, the
bottom 25% of America is poorer than they were twenty-five years
ago, and that’s just plain wrong. Rewards became perverted. The
richest people made the most mistakes with the least accountability.
In too many situations, leaders divided us instead of bringing us
together.

What has happened as a result, I think in part, of the model that Ken
Feinberg has set, as limited as he was to those people, is we see Jeff
Kindler at Pfizer forgoing much of his bonus; we see at Morgan Stanley
the outgoing CEO and the incoming CEO taking the same path; at
Citigroup somebody I’ve been very critical of — I have to admit he has
grown a lot in office — has been taking $1.00 a year, forgoing his
bonuses; the CEO of Coke — and it goes on and on and on. We didn’t
see this before. Many of the titans of industry have been deciding that
shame and accountability matter. It is not going to be legislated or
litigated. It is a sense of responsibility.
The boards are picking up on this little by little. I thought that
when the WorldCom board and the Enron board were found to be
accountable and liable — it was very limited you could say in that same
case — all other directors got scared.
I think Delaware badly mishandled the Eisner/Ovitz situation and
the board got away with perhaps being inept. But it scared directors
everywhere.
Their law was very limited, but it put — was it Samuel Johnson
who said, “Nothing so focuses the mind like the prospect of a hanging”?
You know, the law’s limits, rather than the law’s reach, often is where
some of the biggest things happen. Shame and accountability — I think
that’s the danger that we are seeing.
One of the problems with boards is groupthink — not how
independent they are. You know, the fact that everybody on this panel
has a strong Yale connection doesn’t invalidate us. Groupthink, do we
think the same way? I don’t think we do. Do you have bystander
apathy? Do you have obedience to authority, although we do respect the
Judge? Is that cowardice or courage?
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I think that’s what the Bank of America decision brings out for us.
Some people may be disappointed that we couldn’t see ultimately
slapping down the Bank of America for trying to — the SEC didn’t find
individuals personally accountable. But the message came out, if you
will, from the Judge — I won’t even look your way, so you don’t have
to even acknowledge — is that a message went out that personal
accountability matters.
I went off and took a look at forest products industry executives in
1978. They were the same companies. In some cases, some of the same
individuals went to prison for fixing prices in multi-wall bags and
corrugated containers and folding cartons. The same companies were
hit again and again. Why? There was just a little slap on the wrist of the
company. There was no personal accountability.
Two CEOs back in Xerox in this post-Sarbanes-Oxley era. The
CEO and the president violated — egregious financial fraud issues.
Who was responsible? The shareholders paid the price, and nobody
else.
That stuff has got to end. Personal accountability — even when it
doesn’t happen legally, the shareholders and CEOs are more and more
getting the message. So I think that is the big change.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Let me ask you something. If we have this
great democracy and you have people elected to the board whose
interests are contrary to the workings of the company and to what it
stands for, under corporate governance, how does a company deal with
that? It’s almost like the Hewlett-Packard situation. That’s why the
question I asked Todd before: does democracy really work? Suppose
you have people fighting on the board; is that going to be good for the
corporation?
PROFESSOR SONNENFELD: I think that’s a great question.
Dissent is a good thing. Dissent is not necessarily disloyalty. In that
particular situation, the dissent was, surprisingly, the chairwoman
herself, Patty Dunn, who had the temerity to lead an investigation that
the full board had asked for, but then when they surfaced who the bad
guy was, supposedly somebody named Jay Keyworth, another director
ran cover for him and tried to suppress the whole thing. But the fact is
the dissent itself was a good thing. The bad thing was that confidential
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discussions were being leaked to the outside. So I think on that part,
dissent is good.
But the other side is, Judge, if you will, that what worries some
about the kinds of things that Todd is pursuing — and I completely
applaud Todd — nonetheless, people are worried about dissent when it
comes to the campaign for office. People don’t want to be part of a
competitive slate of rival candidacies. If the board becomes parallel to a
municipal city council meeting or a student council meeting, you are
going to see quality people run for the hills the way we, sadly,
sometimes do in public office.
JUDGE SPORKIN: All right. Gary?
MR. LANG: Could I make one point?
JUDGE SPORKIN: Sure.
MR. LANG: The model for a well-run board comes from private
equity. People are smart. They have money. They take control of a
company. They assist management because they know what they are
doing and ultimately they will sell out because exiting is part of their
strategy. But that is considered to be a role model of what a company
ought to have — smart directors, people who know what they are doing,
with money on the line for themselves.
This approximates what Bob Pozen said in his book. What he is
saying is financial institutions should have a few super-directors who
give three to four days a month to this work and who are experienced in
financial matters. That’s the way we ought to be running some of these
kinds of companies since expertise is combined with the dedication of a
substantial time to the task. I think there is a lot to that.
PROF. SONNENFELD: And they have real risk there. It isn’t
other people’s money. That’s why they become billionaires. It’s their
own money at risk, and we applaud it. We don’t want limits on that.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Gary, let me ask you this question. The SEC
over the years brings a lot of consent decrees. Up until recent times,
they would take it to a judge and the judge would agree to it. Then we
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find in a recent case that a judge says he’s not going to be a rubber
stamp. There used to be a judge who, one time when the government
came to him with a consent decree, asked whether he could use his own
pen to sign the decree. What do you think of this new thing of the courts
substituting their judgment for a regulatory agency? Have you thought
about it? Have you been involved in it?
MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, I’ve thought about what this development
means for the system.
I think the question you raised, Stan, is an interesting one.
Historically, at least based on my anecdotal memory, I don’t ever
remember a single SEC consent decree that was negotiated by both sides
being the subject of any particular judicial scrutiny. The lawyers would
present the document to the Court, it would be entered, and that would
be it.
Indeed, the pattern was really not dissimilar to that of private civil
litigation, where judges really generally don’t get involved. If I sue
somebody and we decide to settle our dispute, the judge is happy to have
the case removed from his or her calendar — save for the class action
area and a few others, where the fairness of the settlement had to be
appraised by the Court.
I think what we have here may well be a dramatic change in how
judges exercise their power with regard to consent decrees. The law
says — and I think Judge Rakoff referred to it in both of his opinions —
that when you are dealing with a public agency, before you approve a
consent decree which implicates the contempt power of the federal court
— that is, if somebody violates the injunction, they can be held in
contempt — you are supposed to find that the settlement is fair, that it is
adequate, that it is reasonable, and that it is in the public interest.
That was the justification for Judge Rakoff’s decision not to
approve the initial Bank of America settlement. The Court’s opinion
turned for the most part on the fact that the Court was concerned —
assuming there was a nondisclosure, and assuming the nondisclosure
was actionable under the securities laws — that the settlement was being
paid for by the victims. The shareholders themselves, who had not
received the information, were the ones who were paying the fine. That
struck the Court as neither appropriate nor in the public interest. Judge
Rakoff did rely on a legal authority I had never heard of before, Oscar
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Wilde, quoting his famous definition of a cynic – someone “who knows
the price of everything and the value of nothing.” I had read some of
Wilde’s work before, but not in the legal setting. In any event, Judge
Rakoff sent the parties out to either go to trial or to come back with a
settlement that would pass muster under the applicable standards.
The parties did come back several months later, just last month,
with a new settlement that the Court approved. Judge Rakoff changed
legal authorities though. He no longer was willing to rely on Oscar
Wilde. He relied instead on a saying of the legal philosopher Yogi
Berra, “I wish I had an answer to that because I’m getting tired of
answering that question.” Apparently, Yogi is pro-settlement while
Oscar is anti-settlement.
What I think is interesting is the Court’s analysis in the second
Bank of America case. In addition to relying on the standards that this
settlement had to be fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest,
Judge Rakoff said, “the law requires the Court to give substantial
deference to the SEC as the regulatory body having primary
responsibility for policing securities markets, especially with matters of
transparency. While such deference can never be absolute, since the
judgment ultimately entered is the Court’s and is enforceable by the
Court’s contempt power” — which in fact he had noted in the first
opinion — “the Court will fail in its duty if it did not give considerable
weight to the SEC’s position.”
The Judge, in determining the fairness of the settlement, actually
looked at the evidentiary materials and agreed with the SEC’s position
that the nondisclosure was the product of negligence, and was a
reasonable, well-grounded position. The Court agreed that, as a matter
of deference, it would approve the settlement, which at that point
included two nondisclosure violations: (1) the bonuses paid to Merrill
executives; and (2) that Merrill was suffering historically great losses in
the fourth quarter of 2008.
The Court also pointed out that considerations of judicial restraint
require that Federal judges have to defer, if in fact the settlement is fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.
What’s interesting is that the parties came back with a series of
prophylactic measures which were not in the first settlement. One was
the retention of an independent auditor to review the bank’s controls,
which reminded me, Judge Sporkin, of the old days when we used to put
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all that stuff in the old SEC consents. Another was requiring the
retention of independent disclosure counsel. As to both measures, the
Court convinced the parties that if the SEC and Bank of America didn’t
agree on who would be retained, that the Court would have the final say.
As to a third prophylactic measure, the retention of a compensation
consultant, Bank of America indicated that they thought that was
appropriately a matter of their own corporate governance and who
would be selected should not be the SEC’s call, nor should it be
determined by the Court.
The question that now remains: to what extent are courts now going
to give enhanced scrutiny to SEC consent decrees? I think Professor
Coffee of Columbia has indicated he thought that this will open the door
to much greater scrutiny. Certainly, in issues where companies have
received TARP funds, that opens the door to greater scrutiny.
A countervailing point is that individuals as well as corporations do
settle SEC cases all the time. Even though they may not necessarily be
guilty of the offense, they may not have the economic wherewithal to
fight the case. They also may not have the emotional wherewithal to
fight the case. People just want to get on with their lives. So there is
that other countervailing dynamic in the settlement process.
PROF. SONNENFELD: Are we certain this is right? As one of the
two non-lawyers on the panel, I am just amazed. Judge, you obviously
were a pioneer, and it made a huge difference to raise the questions you
did. I am in awe of what Judge Rakoff has done following in your
wake.
And yet, you know, I have a Philadelphia lawyer in the room, my
brother Mark — but antitrust settlements, all the time, have come before
judicial review. I can come up with half-a-dozen antitrust settlements,
and I’m not a lawyer — Food & Drug Administration reviews. NHTSA
right now, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s
settlement with Toyota is coming up for judicial review. What’s so
unusual? Is there something about securities law that is so godly we
can’t challenge it the way every other law can be challenged by judicial
review? Mark, am I wrong?
JUDGE SPORKIN: In the Microsoft case, I didn’t approve the
settlement. They appealed me and I got reversed. The Court of Appeals
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said I didn’t have a right to go as far as I did.
I had a little stronger support, I think, than even Judge Rakoff,
because I had a law called the Tunney Act, in which the judge was
supposed to be the gatekeeper. It came out of a matter involving
government corruption. Congress said, “we’re not going to trust the
Antitrust Division anymore. Judges have got to be the gatekeepers.”
So, reading the law the way I read it, I turned down the settlement.
They appealed. They reversed me. And guess what happened? I’ll bet
you nobody here knows what happened. Does anybody know what
happened after that case, after they reversed me?
Where are the students here? Can anybody tell me what happened?
PROF. SONNENFELD: Constantine might know.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Anybody know?
Do you know what
happened?
What happened is, Congress passed a law that said, “we meant what
we said.” The Court of Appeals was wrong, the District Court has
pursuant authority to review antitrust consent decrees where the DOJ is
involved.
Jed, did you come up against that? Did you see that in your
research?
JUDGE RAKOFF 2: How could I have missed it?
JUDGE SPORKIN: Which made me feel very good, that the
Congress can reverse the courts, which I thought was — I used to have a
lot of trouble with my Court of Appeals, but that’s another thing.
In any event, I think he’s dead-on. I mean, just think of a judge
who is asked to put his signature on something. It’s got to mean
something. If the judge feels that it isn’t right and he is uncomfortable,
by golly, I don’t know how you can force him to sign that thing. I don’t
know. That’s why I couldn’t understand my Court of Appeals. I said, “I
need more information. I don’t have enough information.”
But in any event, there is another area, which Judge Rakoff
2

Judge Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, participated in the Lecture as a member of the audience.
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realized, that agencies need deference, parties need to have certainty.
There are a number of judges now that I am aware of that are taking
Judge Rakoff’s viewpoint and being very careful in these settlements
and are looking at them very closely. I think it is probably a good trend,
except if he wants to try the case. I won a lunch on that. I said he was
going to approve it, based upon my own view, saying if I were he I
would not want to try that case. Maybe that was not the reason. In any
event, the case has been settled.
What will happen, though, if there is too much interference, the
SEC probably has enough ability to do its own thing. For example, it
has virtual injunctive power through its cease-and-desist powers. So
they will be able to do quite a bit on their own if they feel that it is
necessary. So there is going to be a little bit of tension, I think, that is
going to occur here.
I’m going to open it up. For any member of the panel, any
questions on anything that we have said here? Go ahead.
QUESTION: We hear a lot about best practices versus other
countries. How is our corporate governance, the cost of it, and our cost
of managerialism in America versus Scandinavian countries?
JUDGE SPORKIN: Anybody know the answer to that question?
PROF. SONNENFELD: Well, I’ll tell you, what never comes out in
governance discussions, for a lot of reasons that might be obvious given
who finances our country these days, is we have an imperfect
governance system, but it is so much better than many of our major
trading partners today.
If we were to take a look at the average major Chinese company,
we are not even looking at anything close. Who represents a minority
interest, because the government is the majority interest on most
Chinese companies? Who are those? A minority person on a board, a
director, is not representing the general corporation. Nothing that we
think about in terms of governance would apply in China.
We look at South Korea, where several hundred top executives
were rounded up — not only indicted, amazingly, in that judicial system,
but actually convicted. It was all overturned, they were pardoned,
because they said, “Gee, we need these people to run the country.”
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I think we do have to work on improving our governance, but it
worries me that we use a pretty good system as the foil to flagellate
ourselves. Again, we have to do better. I think Bank of America was
terrible.
We need to do better, but we should somehow get a voice of
criticism. I’m so glad you asked a comparative question about what is
happening internationally. Whether it’s the OECD or China, they use
the United States as a whipping boy, as a scapegoat.
MR. LANG: I think they do. We borrow from mainly the western
nations, not China, a great deal, and we study it, and often it is cited to
support various governance reforms that people seek to impose.
For example, in London there is a “comply or explain” test which is
generally used. It’s a sensible system. It has been tried here, not too
successfully, but it is something that we can put in.
The SEC here, for example, sometimes regulates through
disclosure. You don’t have to have a governance committee or a
nominating committee, but if you don’t, you’ve got to say in your proxy
statement why. So that’s the kind of thing that has crept in. Some of
that comes from overseas.
Also, one other point. Things are different over there culturally.
There is a working understanding between institutions and companies
and so forth. We are different here. We are spread out. We have a
hybrid system between states and the federal government and so forth.
So I’m not sure most of their rules really apply to us. We have to
fashion our own.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Let me tell you a little bit about Germany,
which I happen to know a little bit about. They have two boards. One is
a board of the people that run the company, of the management. The
other is a super-board. I have found that the problem there is that on the
super-board are representatives from the workers through their union.
At times, management wants to keep from the union things that they
don’t want the union to know about. So it’s a very difficult situation and
one which is not very smoothly run.
That is the kind of thing we are talking about here. How much
dissent do you want in your company if it is running well? You know,
someone is going to say, “Okay, instead of being an apple picker, we’ll
turn it into a grape picker,” or something like that. That’s why these
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things are very difficult to deal with.
PROF. SONNENFELD: Another image we often see, Judge, of
course, is the separation of roles, which is de rigueur in much of Europe,
and, Todd, of course in the United Kingdom, if you think about it.
One of your favorite colleagues, one of my close colleagues who
was a colleague of yours, argues passionately on the separation of roles
needing to occur here. And yet, it has not been preventive on any of
their governance scandals there. Nor, if you look at Enron and
WorldCom, we had the separation of chairman and CEO when the most
horrendous things were happening. It hasn’t been in any way a panacea.
In fact, when scandals have hit at Royal Dutch Shell or other
places, there was total confusion as to who was speaking for the
company. There were so many different people who claimed that they
were the boss.
JUDGE SPORKIN: You had two years ago — it has not been that
long — well, I contend we have the best regulatory system in the world.
I don’t think there’s anything like the one we have. Whatever anyone
says about the SEC or whatnot, it’s still the best.
But two years ago some of our top people in government, including
Secretary Paulson, were against tough regulation. They were telling us
that if we continued with SEC-type regulation and went to the prudential
regulation of the banking organizations, all our financial business would
go overseas. In effect, there was competition as to who could be the
least effective regulator.
But you see, all of a sudden that thing blows up and everybody
says, “What happened to all the regulators? We need more regulation.”
It really boggles one’s mind when I see some of these things.
We were told, for example, a couple months ago that if we didn’t
bail out AIG that the world was going to come to an end — and not only
bail them out, but we had to pay everybody a hundred cents on the
dollar.
Then we get some hearings in Washington where Geithner testifies.
He says, “Who, me? I recused myself from that decision because I was
going to become the Secretary.”
Then they go to Paulson. Paulson said, “I had nothing to do with
it.” This is documented, what I am telling you. He said, “I had nothing
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to do with it. I depended upon the Fed.”
Then they go to Bernanke. He said, “I had nothing to do with it.”
All I want to know is who made those decisions. Who made the
decision to pay people a hundred cents on the dollar? If somebody
would answer that question, I would love to have the answer.
Can anybody here confirm what I’m saying? You didn’t hear the
same thing? I watch C-SPAN. That’s where I get my information.
Bloomberg also reported this. You can’t ask for anything better than
Bloomberg, can you?
MS. STORY: It’s true. I was watching the hearings. You’re right.
I’ll vouch for you. It’s true. I was watching the hearings also.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Am I right?
MS. STORY: Correct.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Geithner said he had nothing to do with it.
MS. STORY: You’re correct. They all said that they didn’t make
the decision.
JUDGE SPORKIN: It reminds me of these three drunks who are in
a car and they crack up and they all fall out. The cop says, “Who was
driving?” “None of us. We were all sitting in the back seat.” These
guys were all sitting in the back seat when the country was going down
the tubes. Gee, I couldn’t believe it.
PROF. SONNENFELD: Your prior point about the overregulation
issues is something that really hasn’t come back to be sufficiently
accountable. You might lay the Goldman decision or other things at the
feet of Secretary Paulson, and people have issues that have come up
once the dam burst as to how Paulson did or didn’t respond. He did
some things very well, some things not so well.
I think his missed moment was what you were talking about. He
created, under great pressure from corporate America to take a look at
these long-term issues that you opened with, Judge, about the loss of
U.S. competitiveness, and instead it got hijacked, I think in part by a
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Harvard Law School professor, to become an ideological rant that your
friend, Harvey Goldschmid, your colleague, would say it was a canard,
and he is right. The loss of IPOs to other markets didn’t happen — we
didn’t lose any domestic companies. There were some international
ones. We are trying to create strong financial markets in Russia.
Rosneft, the energy company, opened in the Moscow market. We
wanted that. In the past it would have been here. When the Bank of
China opened in Hong Kong, it was a great thing. But somehow, this
commission under Paulson was criticizing these things, when there is in
fact explicit U.S. policy to encourage that.
And U.S.-originated business still happened here.
But the
difference was we charge 7% commissions and it’s 2% and 1%
internationally. It was a lot cheaper to do business elsewhere. It was a
real canard to use this regulatory rant, and they have not been held
accountable for it, because that was the moment we could have taken a
look at the mismanagement of risk and the mispricing of risk instead of
creating this nonsense about over-regulation driving business away.
MR. LANG: Jeff, isn’t that what regulatory reform is all about, that
this was all crisis response? Nobody wanted to be responsible.
Everybody is to blame.
The question is: can you have a system which anticipates this sort
of thing, and that has people in power to act with full disclosure and
transparency, so that we don’t run into this again? I think that is the
object — I hope — and that is the big lesson we have learned.
JUDGE SPORKIN: You know what I also love? There are two
other things that are interesting in what we are going to do now. We are
going to now regulate the environment through cap-and-trade. If you
like credit default swaps, you’re going to love cap-and-trade.
Can you imagine giving this to the financial markets to regulate?
And by the way, it’s not new here. This has been used overseas. We
didn’t create it.
The other thing I love is that we are going to give systemic
regulation to the Fed. But what happens when you bring in one of these
economists, like they had in the past, who do not believe in regulation?
What are you going to do? I don’t know if I would give it to the Fed,
I’ll tell you that.
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All right. Some more questions from the audience. Go ahead, sir.
QUESTION: The story that made one of the points that I found
most interesting is in regard to the individuals not being able to be
contained by the governance and regulations that they are trying to
impose. The issue that I have been thinking about while listening to you
is that, even if the individual boards were able to find some type of way
to control the compensation packages, wouldn’t that just allow the best
of the best to go to other firms? They’ll be stealing the labor and going
someplace else to work. Greenhill and Lazard for the last year have
been capturing a whole lot of new capital in that regard.
Then, the question I have is: if that is the case, if the regulations do
go into effect, wouldn’t that start a serious problem in the market,
because if we didn’t have this big blowup, nobody would be crying
about Wall Street? It was a means for a lot of businesses to go out and
to develop and to start up businesses for people to make huge amounts
of money. But it seemed to be good for the companies, and now that we
have these problems, they say it’s not. So what would happen if you
started to regulate that and what would happen with liquidity in the
markets?
JUDGE SPORKIN: I don’t think you can. I would agree with that
question that you raise, and I assume the answer that you gave. But I’ll
let Ms. Story talk about that. I don’t think you can regulate. That would
really destroy — as much as our system can be criticized, but criticizing
it on the kinds of things that I am talking about, where it doesn’t make
sense — but to destroy our whole free enterprise system where people
ought to be able to make — you know, their worth ought to be
determined by what their value is and whatnot.
What do you folks think?
MR. NAFTALIS: Let me sound a slightly different note. With all
the oversized expectations and hoopla out there, what seems to be
getting lost a little bit is that most people who sit on corporate boards of
public companies are honorable people trying to do the right thing.
We should consider why do we have corporations and why do we
have businesses? In a capitalist system, they make products or perform
services and make money for the owners of the business, the
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shareholders. That is a reason why you want good people to serve on
these boards. It is in the public interest that people who serve on
corporate boards are dedicated to fulfill their fiduciary duties and
enhance shareholder value. We want people who are not going to be
concerned about whether they are going to be unfairly criticized because
they are not conforming to the passing view of how much money people
should be paid.
Jeff mentioned the Disney case as being wrongly decided. I think it
was rightly decided, since I tried it. The Disney case is a good example
of the gulf between reality and perception. The Walt Disney Company
had hired Michael Ovitz as President. He didn’t succeed in this job and
was paid a lot of money when he was terminated. Everybody thought,
“oh my God, the board was corrupt, the CEO was corrupt. They just
gave all this money to this guy for no good reason.” That was the public
perception, and that was the perception when we went tried the case.
Except the facts really were different. The facts were that there was
a very good business reason why Ovitz was hired. Michael Eisner, who
I was privileged to represent in the trial, was the CEO of Disney and had
had a phenomenal track record and had saved the company. He then had
a quadruple bypass and his number two at Disney, Frank Wells, died in
a helicopter crash. There was no potential successor to Eisner in the
company and one was needed.
Ovitz was considered to be magic in Hollywood at this time. He
was making a fortune running his talent agency, $20–25 million a year.
So to get Ovitz to come to Disney, you had to offer him a compensation
package where he wouldn’t lose money by making the move. Nobody
ever expected him to fail.
So what we did in trying the case was to show that the directors
properly exercised their fiduciary duties, made a rational business
judgment in hiring Ovitz, and were properly informed both in hiring him
and later in firing him. That is how you want your boards to function.
PROF. SONNENFELD: Just don’t pay him the protection money if
he’s fired for cause, as your client properly did, for egregious poor
performance. He had no defenders in there. But don’t pay him $120
million to leave.
MR. NAFTALIS: But, see, that’s the problem of the misperception
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of the case. He wasn’t fired for cause. The reason he wasn’t fired for
cause was because the general counsel, Sandy Litvack, a very
distinguished lawyer, formerly Assistant Attorney General in Charge of
the Antitrust Division, opined, “we can’t fire him for cause.” We put in
evidence that Eisner had had endless conversations with Litvack saying,
“can’t we find a way to fire him for cause? I don’t want to pay this
guy.” But it was concluded by the general counsel that there were no
legal grounds to terminate Ovitz for cause. After all, they were in
California, where the law is favorable for the employee.
PROF. SONNENFELD: But that is not necessarily the final answer.
That was Litvack’s conclusion. But the fact that he wasn’t showing up
for work, that he had this polarizing effect on virtually every project —
everything about him — there was nobody defending his conduct in
there. He just didn’t happen to kill anybody on the job. But there
wasn’t anybody who was defending his performance. If he couldn’t be
fired for cause, nobody can be fired for cause.
MS. STORY: I think that’s a great point. I think Ovitz is a lot like
a Wall Street trader. This is where I think people have acknowledged
some of the problems with Wall Street pay. You can have a Wall Street
trader who comes in, and you think he’s a sure-fire winner, like Ovitz
looked great for Walt Disney when they hired him, and so no one thinks
he is going to make a bad trade, and blow the place up.
The problem on Wall Street is that the upside for people who work
there is infinite.
PROF. SONNENFELD: It’s not just Wall Street. Carly Fiorina at
HP, she cut her shareholder wealth in half and walked away with $75
million. Bob Nardelli cut his shareholder wealth in half and got twice as
much at Home Depot. It’s not just Wall Street. It’s the failure of board
backbone, and again, back to accountability.
MR. NAFTALIS: Let me just finish one thing on Ovitz. The
reason Ovitz walked away with this package was that was what his
contract provided, and he was the beneficiary of a “perfect storm.”
Ovitz was not a great success as president, and most of the time when
the CEO or the COO does a lousy job, the stock price goes down.
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That’s normally how the world works.
In spite of Ovitz’s performance, Disney’s stock went up 25%
during the fourteen months he served as president. Why he made most
of his money was not because of the fixed salary or severance payouts in
his contract. It was because the increased stock prices made his stock
options very, very valuable. He was in the right place at the right time.
PROF. SONNENFELD: If shareholder price was the determinant,
we wouldn’t need courts and juries and judges and this whole building
and the people here, because certainly you look at a lot of companies
with soaring performance that had, say, options back-dating. You could
use your argument and say, “gee, let’s not police any of those prominent
name-brand CEOs at United Healthcare or things like that, because look
how well the shareholders are doing. Why hurt them?” But in fact they
broke the law. Isn’t the law superior to the shareholder performance?
MR. LANG: But not the contract. Term contracts are customarily
terminable for cause which is defined, but realistically results in a
limited termination right. The term does not depend on the performance
of a corporation or the individual executive, and legal violations as cause
are limited by definition. Stock price is often more directly related to
compensation than the termination of the employment agreement.
PROF. SONNENFELD: By the way, I was going to congratulate
you on having so efficiently captured the notion of the nobility of so
many board directors stepping in there, until you went down that Disney
path. You of course know more than I, but I have opinions anyway. I
actually love the way you phrased it, Gary. You said it much more
eloquently than I would have.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Any more questions?
Yes, there’s a gentleman in the rear.
QUESTION: I worked at Citibank for twenty years before it lost its
ethical balance. I’d like to just share an anecdote with you.
About thirty years ago, Citibank bought a large German bank, and
we really, I must say, didn’t know all we should have when we bought
the bank. But it turned out that in order to put somebody on the board of
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supervisors, that person had to take personal financial responsibility for
any bank failure.
The lawyers searched around and searched around, and if the bank
guaranteed it, then it violated the rule. It was only when a very, very
competent and very self-confident manager at the bank said, “I’ll step up
and do it and I’ll take the responsibility,” that we were able to put
somebody on. I remember the anecdote. It’s very funny.
I just want to make a very quick observation. When discussions of
compensation come up, somehow we never talk about the real driving
function behind compensation, which is earnings. We are obviously
manic about earnings.
Now, it’s a little bit out of the box, but maybe our current definition
of earnings is a little out of date. We define earnings almost the way
you would define how much a candy store makes. But we don’t take
into account all of the other factors that a corporation deals with as part
of our society. It’s a little bit out of the box, but —
PROF. SONNENFELD: No. A lot of the things that should come
out of even Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan and others now, at least
have multiyear clawbacks and things, so that if the performance fails —
I know you were talking about much more in terms of social impact,
community, and the rest, but at least in terms of sustained performance
after they get their cash, that can be recovered if the place fails
afterwards, if the deals collapse afterwards. These are some major
voluntary changes that even Wall Street has been bringing in. So you’re
right, I think it was too narrowly focused on the short term.
QUESTIONER: I just want to make one more observation about
how accounting is not keeping up with where we are. It has been
observed that when Microsoft calculates its assets, those assets are the
buildings and computers that it owns. Well, those are the least important
assets in the company. We have walked away from dealing with the
problem of real assets, which is the knowledge base they have put
together. That is just an example of where perhaps it is the accountants
that are failing us right now.
PROF. SONNENFELD: Well, if the accountants took on this panel
with me off of it, they would depreciate by age, and wouldn’t that be a
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JUDGE SPORKIN: Any further questions we have?
spent our time? Are we over our time?

Have we

mistake?

VOICE: We’re over.
JUDGE SPORKIN: Well, thank you for coming.

